Meanwhile, as working visits by State Secretary Eric van der Burg to the Binnenhof in The Hague are presented as an effort to strengthen ties within the Kingdom, the sentiment on the islands is completely different. Behind the facade of an “equal partnership,” the political reality in Bonaire and Aruba shows a worrying pattern of unilateral legislation, structural financial pressure, and a systematic disregard for the local democratic mandate.
In both Kralendijk and Oranjestad, communities and their representatives feel that crucial decisions are being dictated from a legal distance of thousands of kilometers. What was supposed to be a Kingdom based on mutual respect and autonomy according to the Charter (Staatuut), is increasingly showing the face of a government where The Hague imposes its will with a tight grip on the purse strings.
Bonaire: The Illusion of Equality and a Public Body (Openbaar Lichaam) That Is Not a Municipality as Propagated, but a Territory Administered by The Hague Without Rights
The situation in Bonaire rests on a democratic wound that has never healed. In 2010, an overwhelming majority of no less than 88%, and in 2015, 66% of Bonaireans voted against the current status of a “public body” (openbaar lichaam) during two referendums. Despite these democratic rejections, the Netherlands chose to brush the results aside and push structural integration forward against the voice and wishes of the people. This contempt for popular sovereignty remains a stain on the relationship with The Hague. While there is talk of working together and having equality, the practice is entirely different. Bonaire continues to fight to this day, and currently, the criticism has reached an international level.
The United Nations (UN) has expressed severe concern over the unequal treatment that citizens of Bonaire receive compared to residents of the European Netherlands. Whether it concerns the definition of the social minimum, healthcare, or infrastructure, the reality is that a citizen in Kralendijk does not have the same fundamental rights as a citizen in Almere or Eindhoven, or across the Netherlands like all Dutch nationals.
This raises a structural question: What is Bonaire really to the Netherlands? In practice, the ministry in The Hague treats the island like a Dutch municipality when it comes to imposing obligations, but refuses to grant the constitutional rights that come with it. The current revision of the WolBES and FinBES laws is the most recent example: these laws are felt as a unilateral dictate decided by the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), while local politicians and the public had no real voice in the final decision. This exact same practice shows the very same pattern that the Kingdom Act HOfA brings for Aruba.
This contrast between the harsh reality of governance and beautiful words of equality raises serious speculation around the historic apologies for the history of slavery. Many on the island wonder if those apologies were sincere, or if they were purely political theater to polish the moral image of the Netherlands, while colonial reflexes within the current governance structure remain completely intact.
Aruba: The Struggle for Autonomy and the Bypassing of Parliament
Meanwhile, in Aruba, constitutional tensions have escalated to a boiling point regarding the Kingdom Act for Financial Supervision (HOfA). This dispute puts a structural red light on the island’s separation of powers (trias politica). While the executive branch—the Government of Aruba formed by the AVP-FUTURO coalition—gave its cooperation behind closed doors, the legislative branch of the Parliament of Aruba has, to this day, not held a meeting or been called to handle the law before the Government takes it to the Netherlands. Parliamentarians flatly refuse to grant consensus.
The very essence of a Kingdom Act (Rijkswet) demands legal consensus between the countries. The HOfA lacks this consensus in Parliament and goes directly against agreements made in the Interparlementair Koninkrijksoverleg (IPKO). If the Netherlands chooses to formally push this law through the Council of State (Raad van State) and the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), knowing that the supreme voice of the Aruban people said “No,” the credibility of consultative bodies like IPKO will be reduced to a mere talking club without any real power.
The Hague continuously demands “good governance” from the islands, but at the same time, it tolerates and exploits the fact that the government of Aruba acts outside its own parliament to make deals, judging by recent movements. Such an action by a Dutch Prime Minister toward the House of Representatives would mean an immediate constitutional crisis in the Netherlands. Why is what is unthinkable in The Hague permitted in Aruba when it fits the Dutch agenda?
The “control strategy” used in Bonaire is now dressed in an Aruban jacket. There is great mystery surrounding these negotiations, and speculation is rife that the future destination of the vital refinery lands (Lago/Valero) is playing a role in the strategic pressure the Netherlands is applying. When the Netherlands ties financial aid and favorable refinancing terms to the condition that Aruba must surrender part of its budgetary sovereignty, this is not assistance between partners, but a financial dictate abusing the vulnerable position of the island.
The bypassing of parliamentary democracy is evident in the fact that the corresponding local law, the Landsverordening (LWHO), has not been approved or debated by the Parliament (Staten) of Aruba. Public meetings on this topic are suspiciously avoided in Oranjestad, despite requests and reminders (rappels) sent by parliamentarians since March. How is it possible that the legislative process in the House of Representatives in The Hague is moving at full speed, while locally the democratic debate has not even been permitted to take place?
A Constitutional Crossroads
Continuous pressure from The Hague is fueling deep distrust and growing resistance on the islands, destroying the foundation of mutual trust. Impactful legislation like the HOfA or the revision of WolBES cannot be effective if it is imposed from above. Even within Aruba’s own governing coalition, resistance is visible, raising the question of how the Netherlands expects to successfully implement these laws if the base of support is crumbling on all sides.
The ultimate test for democracy within the Kingdom lies in a single question: If the people and their legal representatives officially say “NO” to the conditions of The Hague, is the Dutch government willing to respect that democratic will and change course? Or does the word autonomy within the Kingdom of the Netherlands exist only on paper, as long as the islands keep bowing their heads and saying “Yes” to everything The Hague dictates?
In this case, if the HOfA law passes, Aruba will become just like Bonaire? the Netherlands will decide and Aruba must implement. If Aruba has its own ideas, they can only be implemented if the Netherlands wants it, not because Aruba deems it good for its own economy. Article 38 of the HOfA law says it all, along with the exit clause (exitbepaling) meant to illustrate a way out, but in reality, that exit door remains completely out of reach