The recently published opinion by the Council of State of the Kingdom regarding the HOFA consensus kingdom law (consensusrijkswet financial supervision Aruba) raises fundamental constitutional criticisms. According to constitutional law professors Prof. mr. D.J. Elzinga and Prof. mr. J.L.W. Broeksteeg, this eagerly awaited opinion falls short and is a disappointment when it comes to analysis and depth. The document glosses over the structural problems surrounding the concept of the consensus kingdom law and fails to thoroughly address the critical constitutional points.
As the most problematic element, the professors highlight the authority whereby the Kingdom Council of Ministers must grant approval to the Government of Aruba. According to current constitutional dogmatics, this construction does not fit within the system and is therefore legally deficient.
Main Points of Criticism
• Lack of analysis and depth: Despite high expectations fueled by polarized relations in Aruba and the critical report from Aruba’s Advisory Council (Raad van Advies), the Council of State pays practically no attention to the statutory and constitutional dimensions of the law.
• Deficient approval authority: The draft bill obliges the Government of Aruba to have changes to the National Ordinance (Landsverordening) approved by the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom. The professors point out that decisions by the council of ministers have an internal character and should not have an external effect (erga omnes) on third parties. This runs counter to the accepted constitutional system.
• Voluntariness and “Do ut Des”: HOFA supervision stems from corona loans, through which Aruba gained access to more favorable loans in exchange for accepting this supervision. This unequal power dynamic (“Goliath and the dwarf”) opens the door to a structural loss of Caribbean autonomy.
• Uncertain temporariness: The argument that HOFA supervision is temporary is unrealistic. Because Aruba cannot unilaterally decide to end the supervision (article 42 requires a request to the Kingdom Council of Ministers where the Netherlands is dominant), the threat of a long-term limitation of autonomy remains present.
• Democratic deficit and budgetary rights: Because the Kingdom Act (Rijkswet) takes precedence over Aruba’s Constitution (Staatsregeling) and the role of the Kingdom Council of Ministers is incorporated unconstitutionally, the authors maintain that an ordinary majority vote in the Parliament of Aruba (Staten) is insufficient; this would require at least a two-thirds majority or a prior amendment to the constitution.
• Lack of legal protection: Article 32 of the HOFA Kingdom Act does not provide sufficient legal protection. No appeal is possible against a refusal by the Kingdom Council of Ministers to halt supervision, resulting in a situation where “the butcher inspects his own meat.”
Aruba’s strong financial position raises questions
The article also raises the urgent question of why strict HOFA supervision is still appropriate. Figures from the Council of State itself show that by March 2026 Aruba’s debt had dropped to 61% of GDP — a level lower than before the COVID-19 pandemic — and that the country has achieved structural budget surpluses in recent years.
The existing LAFT structure (Landsverordening Aruba Financieel Toezicht) has been functioning properly since 2015. The authors conclude that the price Aruba pays for introducing the HOFA Kingdom Act, tending toward a deep and possibly prolonged limitation of its own autonomy, stands in stark contrast to the country’s positive financial reality in the year 2026.